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The paper studies regional (spatial) inequality in five most populous 
countries in the world: China, India, the United States of America, 
Indonesia and Brazil in the period 1980-2000. They are all federations or 
quasi-federations composed of entities with substantial economic 
autonomy. Two types of regional inequalities are considered: Concept 1 
inequality which is inequality between mean incomes (GDPs per capita) of 
states/provinces and Concert 2 inequality which is inequality between 
population-weighted regional mean incomes. The first inequality speaks to 
the issue of  regional convergence, the second, to the issue of overall 
inequality as perceived by citizens within a nation. All three Asian 
countries, show  rising inequality in terms of both concepts in the decade 
of the 1990’s. Divergence in income outcomes is particularly noticeable 
for the most populous states/provinces in India and China. United States, 
where regional inequality is the least, shows further convergence. Brazil, 
with the highest level of regional inequality, displays no trend. A 
regression analysis fails to establish robust  association between the usual 
macro variables and the two types of  regional  inequality. 
 
Key words: China, India, USA, Brazil, Indonesia, regional inequality, world inequality 
JEL classification:  R12,  I3, 057 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3699, September 2005 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 
or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. 
                                                           
1 I am grateful to Tamar Manuelyan Atinc,  Roberto Zagha, Bala Bhaskar Naidu and Bert Hofman for 
providing most of the regional GDP data used in this paper. Gouthami Padam was an excellent research 
assistant, and I am grateful to her. I am grateful to Isabelle Bensidoun, Guillaume Daudin, Bert Hofman, 
Ravi Kanbur, Bert Keidel, Christian Morrisson, Mansoob Murshed, Martin Ravallion, Erik Thorbecke, 
Xiaobo Zhang, an anonymous referee, and participants of a conference on inequality in China at Cornell 
University and at Brookings Institution for very useful comments. Work was financed by a grant from 



















































































































   3
1. Introduction 
 
  Global inequality is strongly influenced by what happens to populous countries,  
both to their average income levels, and inequality within each country. If we look at the 
former, fast growth rates of China and more recently of India, by reducing their relative 
income distance from the United States and other rich countries, have lowered global 
inequality. Fast (average) growth in these nations is the most important element 
contributing both to lower global inequality and to lower global poverty. At the same 
time however within these nations, there are increasing cleavages: some provinces grow 
faster than others, so mean income differences between the provinces increase. In 
addition, the process of growth is accompanied in both China and India by increasing 
inequality between individuals in the country as well as within most provinces and states  
(see for example, Jha (2004) for India; Chen and Wang ( 2001) for China).  
 
The objective of  this paper is to explore the subnational changes in the five most 
populous countries in the world: China, India, United States, Indonesia, and Brazil. We 
examine these changes  for three reasons. First, as already mentioned, subnational 
changes in populous countries are important because  they are a significant determinants 
of global inequality. The second reason lies in   what subnational changes imply for 
national unity. One of the concerns of the Chinese leadership, for example, is how rising 
income differences between the prosperous coastal provinces and the less dynamic North 
East may  affect China’s political unity (see Renard, 2002). 
2 The third reason to look at 
the subnational level is that it provides us with some lessons regarding what we might 
expect at the global level were most of the obstacles to free circulation of labor, capital 
and goods to be lifted. For obviously although these obstacles still exist in a number of 
countries even between their constituent units, they are dramatically lower than between 
nations.  For example, shipment of goods between different Indian states is, in many 
                                                           
2 In June 2004, nine Chinese provinces (Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, 
Hainan and Sichuan) and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau created a Pan Pearl  
River Regional Cooperation Council whose objective is to eliminate nontariff barriers between the 
provinces and to coordinate provincial economic policies. One of the objectives was to speed up growth in 
order to catch up with Shanghai and the booming Yangtze River basin (see International Herald Tribune, 
“Chinese provinces form a trading bloc”, June 2, 2004, p. 17). 
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cases, subject to fees or border check but this is a far cry from the obstacles to 
international trade. Similarly, labor mobility in China is formally restricted as people 
need to have a permit in order to live in large cities but these rules are most often ignored, 
and even if they were fully implemented, the rules are much less stringent than the rules 
governing circulation of labor between nations. It is thus important to find out whether a 
generally unhindered movement of goods, labor and capital leads provinces toward 
convergence in their mean incomes or not.  
 
A comparison between subnational inequalities in these five countries is 
meaningful despite the fact that the number and size of regional units vary. If states and 
provinces were based on randomly drawn border lines, it could be indeed argued that 
greater regional inequality in one country compared to another is simply an artifact, 
possibly due to the way such regional units are defined. However, in most or all cases 
with which we deal here, provinces/states possess both a significant amount of autonomy 
and specificity. Inequality between them thus does have a bearing on the issues of 
horizontal equity, and particularly so where states differ in their religious and ethnic 
composition.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present some data that 
show the importance of the five countries in total world income, population and global 
inequality. In Section 3, we move to the subnational level of analysis and present a brief 
review of the literature dealing with the issue of regional inequality in the five countries. 
In Sections 4, we look at the evolution of the differences between mean incomes of the 
regions during the last twenty years in each of the five nations.
3 It is here that we address 
the issues of income convergence or divergence within each country. In Section 5, we 
look at the differences in mean regional incomes but now with each region weighted by 
its population share. Once we weigh them by their populations, we come closer to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 We use the term “region” to indicate a subnational unit whether its exact appellation is “state” or 
“province” or “republic”; the term “nation” or “country” is used to designate the subjects of the 
international law, that is the five countries included in the analysis here. 
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explaining the actual “feeling” of inequality within each nation particularly when 
differences in mean regional incomes coincide with other horizontal cleavages like 
ethnicity or religion. We also come closer to explaining the overall national inequality 
between individuals because the only part which is not included now is the part of 
inequality—at times substantial, it is true—which is due to inter-personal income 
differences within each region. In Section 6, we try to identify the policies or factors at  
national level which might explain the process of regional convergence or divergence; in 
other words, we try to find some regularities explaining why regions are converging or 
diverging. Section 7 presents the conclusions.  
 
2. The importance of the five countries in the world  
 
  Table 1 shows the share of the five most populous countries in world population 
and income in 1980, 1990 and 2000.  Their share in world population has throughout 
remained at just above one-half. However, their share in world output has expanded from  
a bit over one-third to 44 percent.   
Table 1.Share of the five largest countries in world population and world income (in %) 
  1980 1990 2000 
Share in world 
population  
51.7 50.6 50.8 
Share in world PPP 
output 
34.3 36.6 44.0 
 
The increase in the five countries’ share in world income was driven by the 
growth (compared to world mean income) of all countries save Brazil (Table 2). The 
most extraordinary was of course China’s growth. In 1980, China’s GDP per capita was 
just under 17 percent of  the world average. In 2000, it was in excess of 60 percent. The 
United States likewise grew faster than world mean income: its GDP per capita was 4.3 
times greater than the world mean in 1980, while in 2000, it was almost 4.6 times as high. 
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Table 2. The five large countries’ GDPs per capita compared to the world mean 
 
  1980 1990 2000  Change   
(1980-2000) 
India  0.164 0.206 0.246  +0.082 
China  0.169 0.307 0.602  +0.433 
Indonesia  0.364 0.495 0.527  +0.163 
Brazil  1.029 0.869 0.822 -0.207 
United  States  4.308 4.470 4.579  +0.271 
Note: All calculations done for GDP per capita expressed in 1995 international (PPP) dollars. Source: 
World Bank. 
 
What is the importance of these countries for global inequality? Being the most 
populous countries in the world, they  will obviously influence, sometimes decisively, 
global inequality. However when we address the issues of global inequality we have to be 
very careful in what exactly we are measuring. The first concept of inequality (dubbed 
Concept 1 by Milanovic, 2005)) measures differences in mean incomes between 
countries. No weighting is involved here and each country counts the same. This concept 
is important if we are interested whether there is unconditional divergence or 
convergence of mean (countries’) incomes in the world, but there our five countries   
count as much as any other five countries in the world. 
 
Concept 2 inequality is different. It likewise takes mean national incomes but 
weighs them by countries’ populations. Now, of course, our five countries will matter a 
lot because they account for almost one-half of world income and population. But note 
that when we use Concept 2 inequality, we disregard the entire inequality due to the 
differences in personal incomes within nations, that is we assume that each individual has 
the mean income of his/her country. Concept 3 inequality (inequality between all 
individuals in the world) is accordingly underestimated by  Concept 2 inequality. 
4 
 
Table 3 shows that the differences in mean incomes (GDPs per capita) between 
the five countries (that is, disregarding their interactions with other countries) account for 
between a fifth and a third of total Concept 2 inequality in the world (depending on 
                                                           
4 However about ¾ of Concept 3 inequality in the world is accounted for by the differences in countries’ 
mean incomes (Milanovic, 2002 and 2005).  
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whether we use Gini or Theil index). It is important to explain how this calculations is  
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where yi  = GDP per capita of i-th country (and yj>yi), pi = population share of i-th 
country, and μ = mean world income. Thus, Gini Concept 2 for the world is calculated by 
taking the absolute differences in mean incomes between all countries in the world, 
normalizing them by the world mean income and weighing by  the population shares. To 
calculate the part due to the five countries we “extract” only those individual  inter-




, where both i and j belong to “our” five 
countries. Thus, for example, in 1980, the US GDP per capita was $PPP 21,755 and 
China’s $PPP 852. The difference between the two amounted to $PPP 20,900. In terms of 
world mean income (which was then $5,050), the difference was 4.13 times. This is in 
turn weighted by US and Chinese population shares (0.054 and 0.234 respectively), and 
the obtained value 5.3 Gini points represents the contribution of the difference in mean 
incomes between the  United States and China to Concept 2 world Gini. The same 
calculation is repeated for all five countries (there is in total 10 such calculations). The 
sum gives the total amount of the direct contribution due to the interaction between the 
five countries. As Table 3 shows, it did not change much in the last twenty years: it 
oscillated around 11 Gini points throughout. 
 
Note however that these calculations leave out all the similar interactions between 
each of our five countries and the rest of the world (say, China vs. Germany, or US vs. 
Nigeria, or India vs. Senegal etc.) which also contribute to world inequality. If we add all  
these contributions, we notice that they have declined from almost 17 Gini points in 1980 
to 14 Gini points in 2000. The decline was almost entirely due to China’s  fast growth 
that diminished the distance, and hence the inequality terms, between herself and the rest 
of the (rich) world. Overall the five largest countries contribute around one-half of total 
global Concept 2 inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.    8
Differently, we can measure inequality by using the Theil index. The Theil index 
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Here we take the same approach: we “extract” only the 
μ μ
yi yi
pi ln  terms 
belonging to our five countries. The contribution of the US is obtained (again using the 
1980 data) as the product of its population share (0.054) with its income relative to the 
world mean (20,900/5050=4.308) times the log of the last amount. To get the total 
contribution of the five countries, we simply add such amounts. 
5  Their contribution to 
the global Theil-measured  Concept 2 inequality varies between one-third in 1980 and 37 
percent in 2000 (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Direct and total contribution of the five largest countries to  
Concept 2 global inequality 
 
  1980 1990 2000 
Gini     
Concept 2 Gini (world)  54.1  52.9  50.2 
Interaction between the five countries 
(Gini points) 
11.6 10.8 11.3 
Interaction of the five with other 
countries (Gini points) 
16.9 15.6 14.0 
Total percentage contribution  53  50  50 
     
Theil entropy     
Concept 2 Theil (world)  63.3  59.8  52.3 
Contribution of five largest countries 
(Theil points) 
21.0 17.8 19.4 
Percentage  contribution  33 30 37 
Note: Concept 2 inequality is inequality between mean countries’  GDPs per capita  weighted by 
countries’ populations.  Both Gini and Theil expressed in percentages. 
                                                           
5 Unlike the Gini coefficient which is based on bilateral comparisons of income between all countries and 
allows us to distinguish the contribution of each and every pair of countries, Theil index just sums 
individual countries’ contributions. In other words, it cannot distinguish between the contribution due to the 
interaction between the five countries themselves, and the five countries and the rest of the world.   9
 
3. A brief review of regional (within-country) inequality studies
6 
 
The issues we address here—Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality within nations—
have been, in slightly different contexts, addressed before. This was done in two contexts. 
The first is the issue of regional inequality within countries. There are two views in the 
literature that are often juxtaposed. The first is due to Williamson (1965)  who argued 
that in the early stages of economic development, regional inequality would tend to rise 
as growth occurs in discrete locales, but that later inequalities will decline as equilibrating 
forces such as better infrastructure, technological diffusion, decreasing returns to capital 
in richer and high-wage areas, diseconomies of agglomeration etc. become stronger. 
Thus, regional inequality is expected to follow an inverted U shape as income level 
grows. Williamson’s reasoning is closely related to the idea of the Kuznets curve where 
similar development although not in spatial terms produces first an increase and then a 
decline in inequality. It is also based on the neoclassical (Solow-type) assumptions which 
include decreasing marginal returns.  A different view has been proposed more recently  
within the context of the new economic geography school (Krugman and Venables, 
1995) and endogenous growth (Romer  1986; see also a recent review by Easterly and 
Levine 2002). There the argument is that that increasing returns to scale and advantages 
of agglomeration of capital and knowledge will tend to perpetuate, or even increase, 
spatial inequalities. Yet in Krugman and Venables (1995), decreasing transportation costs 
may play an offsetting role: assume that transportation costs are zero, then the advantage 
of cheap labor in less developed countries (or regions) will, to some extent, tend to offset 
the advantages of increasing returns to scale. 
 
The key difference between these two approaches seems not to lie in their view of the 
short-run developments, where they all, including the earlier development theories such 
as Myrdal’s (1957), Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943), Hirschmann (1958) or Perroux (1970; 
1988), seem to agree that growth is disequalizing, but  in their view of the long-run 
developments where either traditional neoclassical assumptions dominate—rendering 
                                                           
6 Since we deal with regional inequality, we do not review studies of the most common Concept 3 (inter-
personal) inequality.  
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growth ultimately equalizing in spatial terms as well—or where such assumptions are 
rejected or made less potent thus weakening the forces which make for spatial equality. 
7 
Recently, the short- and long-run aspects have been combined in a paper by Petrakos, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Roviolis (2003), which looks at the regional inequalities within the 
European  Union (with several regions defined within each country). The authors find 
that that the short-term effects of growth are disequalizing in the sense that higher growth 
rate tends to increase regional inequality (controlling for all other country-relevant 
attributes), while higher income level is associated with lower regional inequality. The 
authors interpret the second finding as implying the long-run equilibrating effects of 
growth along the lines of the Solow and Williamson models. Their measure of regional 
inequality, as in several other papers (e.g. Akita and Kataoka (2003) regarding Japan; 
Akita and Kawamura (1992) regarding Indonesia and China; Bhalla, Yao and Zhang 
(2003) and Kanbur and Zhang (2003) for China) is the population-weighted coefficient of 
variation or population weighted Theil index. This is what we called Concept 2 
inequality, and the justification for using Concept 2  (rather than Concept 1) inequality is 
that it reflects regional inequality as experienced by an “average” person; in other words, 
regional divergence which may be due to a few sparsely populated regions’ either very 
fast or very slow growth is rather irrelevant for the actual feeling of spatial (horizontal) 
inequality as experienced by the people in the country.  
 
But the issue of regional inequality—using Concept 1 inequality—has also recently 
received quite a lot of prominence due to the popularity enjoyed by the so-called growth 
convergence literature. While the convergence issues have originally been defined and 
studied at the level of countries (that is, convergence of national economies), they have 
recently been studied at the level of subnational regions. For the countries included here, 
such papers are Zhang, Liu and Yao (2001) for China, Azzoni (2001) for Brazil, Ram 
(1992) for the United States, and Jha (2004) and Dreze and Srinivasan (2000) for India.
8 
The rationale for the interest in Concept 1 inequality is very different from the interest in 
                                                           
7 There is an obvious link between these views, as couched in terms of regional developments within 
individual countries and regional developments in the world as in Krugman and Venables (1995) or 
Krugman (1991).   11
Concept 2 inequality. The issue of convergence of (unweighted) regions within a country, 
or (unweighted) countries in the world, addresses the problem of whether the same or 
similar economic policies produce similar results or not. Consider the example of a 
country which has a single national economic policy, that is where there is no significant 
regional freedom of economic policy-making. Suppose that Concept 2 regional inequality 
is decreasing. But if we still find that Concept 1 inequality is increasing, it raises the 
interesting question of what characteristics enjoyed by some regions are responsible for 
their not catching up (or for their growing too fast). Thus both Concept 1 and Concept 2 
inequality are of interest.  
 
We shall now briefly review some of key (representative) regional inequality studies 
that deal with the five great federations included here.
 9 The studies of China are the most 
numerous. There are two reasons for this. First, the extremely fast growth of Chinese 
economy over the last quarter century has been associated with increasing regional 
inequalities. This has obvious implications both for political stability and for economic 
theory, that is for figuring out why and how certain regions grow and others don’t, and 
whether the dominant feature of China’s inequality is rural vs. urban inequality, or inter-
provincial inequality. The consensus seems to be that it is the former. 
10 For example, 
Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003) calculate inequality in per capita consumption across 
provincial and urban-rural partitions (that is, they use data for mean annual incomes for  
rural and urban areas for each province, that is 28 provinces times 2 = 56 observations
11) 
and find that in 1995,  more than ¾ of thus calculated Theil Concept 2 inequality is 
accounted for by the rural-urban split.
12 This is a result similar to the one obtained by 
Kanbur and Zhang (2003) who find that the same urban-rural split (that is, the difference 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8  For other countries, see Goerlich and Mas (2001) for Spanish provinces, Yemtsov (2002) for the  
subjects of the Russian Federation.  
9 We use the term ”federation” in a technical sense, to indicate that the constituent parts do have some 
power of economic decision-making and represent meaningful entities in historic, ethnic or religious sense. 
Not all of the five countries studied here are federations in a juridic sense of the word (see also Annex 1). 
10 When it comes to inter-provincial inequality, it seems to be more the case of  “club” inequality, that is of 
three clubs (East, West, Center) diverging from each other (see Yao and Zhang  2001).  
11 More exactly, they have the data on mean per capita consumption of peasants and non-peasants (by 
province) as obtained from Chinese household surveys. They interpret peasant consumption to be rural, and 
likewise non-peasant to be equivalent to urban (see Bhalla et al., p. 945). 
12 It is notable that the share of the urban-rural difference in total appears constantly high, that is between 
70 and 80 percent, from 1952 to the end of century (see Bhalla et al (2003, Table 2, p. 947)).   12
between mean urban and mean rural income  by province) explains  56 percent of 
Concept 2 inequality (calculated from the same 56 observations).
13 The results of these 
two studies and a few others are compared in Annex 2.  
 
The second reason lies in the lack of individual-level data on income inequality in 
China, that is lack of data on Concept 3 inequality. 
14Concept 2 regional inequality can be 
used, if our partitioning is sufficiently fine, to approximate the evolution in Concept 3 
inequality. In other words, if we think that most of inequality is spatial, and use a very 
fine partition (divide the country in meaningful but also numerous regional units) then 
thus calculated Concept 2 inequality should approximate, if not necessarily the level then 
the evolution, of Concept 3 inequality. To see this consider that, at the extreme, every 
individual can be treated as a “region”: then Concept 2 inequality collapses into Concept 
3 inequality.  This was, for example, the approach underlying Kanbur and Zhang (2003) 
paper on regional inequality in China. As in the Bhalla et al. (2003), Kanbur and Zhang 
divide China into 28 provinces and each of the provinces into its rural and urban areas. 
They have the data for mean incomes for  each of thus defined 56 regions for the period 
1952-2000. They calculate Concept 2 inequality from these means, find that the rural-
urban split accounts for the bulk of total inequality (much more than the inland-coastal 
split)
15 but use the Concept 2 inequality as a proxy for the Concept 3  inequality. Then 
they try to relate changes in Concept 2 inequality levels over the last 50 years to various 
policy episodes (Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, agricultural liberalization, 
urban and industrial liberalization etc.) They find that the Concept 2 inequality, with this 
relatively fine partition, amounts in 2000 to a Gini of 37.2 which, of course, sets a rather 
high lower bound to total personal  income inequality in China.
16 
                                                           
13 Why these two results are not the same is puzzling. A comparison of the results of these two studies and 
a few others can be found in Annex 2 of the Internet version of this paper available at 
http://econpapers.hhs.se/RAS/pmi44.htm 
14 Of course, there are many studies of inter-personal inequality in China. They are however all 
approximations based on the published group data from national surveys since Chinese authorities have 
been unwilling to share micro (individual-level) data.  
15 Although after 1993, there is a rapid increase in the within-urban and  within-rural components indicating 
that there are widening income differentiations within urban and within rural areas as well. (“Within” in this 
context means “between mean incomes of rural (or urban) provincial incomes.”) 
16 When we use regional GDP per capita as welfare indicators (as here) to derive Concept 2 inequality, its 
value cannot be fully taken as the lower bound of Concept 3 inequality because of likely transfers between   13
As for other countries, Jha (2004), in a study of India’s inequality over the last fifty 
years looks at the issue of Concept 1 convergence between the states and concludes that 
divergence has been more common and has accelerated since the reforms in the early 
1990’s. Ram (1992),  and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) have done similar analysis for 
the United States. Ram (1992) finds a steadily decreasing inter-state inequality from 1950 
to 1980 and an increase in the next decade. For Brazil, Azzoni (2001, p. 137) shows  
decreasing Concept 1 inequality throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s and a stable one in the 
last twenty years. 
 
As this brief review shows, regional inequality studies fall into three categories that 
closely match our three concepts of inequality. Many of them, in the wake of the 
convergence literature, deal with Concept 1 inequality. Others, perhaps equally   
numerous, deal with Concept 2 inequality—regional or horizontal inequality as actually 
“experienced” by the population. Finally, some use regional partition (Concept 2 
inequality) as a proxy for Concept 3 inequality.  
 
It should be noted that the work on regional inequality is not facilitated by the   
absence of an accepted or clear terminology. The results are often impenetrable because 
the same term, say “regional inequality” may be used to represent Concept 1 or Concept 
2 inequality. Even the term “region” is sometimes used for the smallest units (say, states 
in a country) and, perhaps in the same paper, for the agglomeration of several such units 
into a larger whole which is still not national level (thus, for example, authors often write 
of China’s three regions: East, Center and West, and of China’s regions, meaning in the 
latter case provinces). As a consequence, “regional inequality” might mean either one of 
the four combinations:  Concept 1 or Concept 2 inequality, or inequality between the 
provinces or inequality between agglomerations of provinces, that is larger “regions.” In 
addition,  the share of the between (inter-regional) component is quite different—even if 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the regions. This is different from the analysis on the global level when redistributive transfers between the 
countries are minimal. I owe this point to Christian Morrisson. 
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the partitions are the same—if we look at the “between” share in total interpersonal 
(Concept 3) inequality or in Concept 2 inequality.
17  
 
Even the measures of inequality are often opaque. While many authors use Theil 
indexes because of their decomposition properties, it is not always clear if Theil (1)  also 
known as Theil entropy measure, or Theil (0) also known as mean log deviation index is 
used. While the use of one or another Theil index does not have an impact on results 
within each individual study (since the measures move almost always the same way), it 
does render difficult comparison of the absolute values of inequality measures from 
several different studies.
18 We have tried to be as clear as possible in our terminology 
here and to the risk of being repetitive will use “Concept 1” and “Concept 2” inequality 
often in order to avoid possible misunderstanding.  Similarly, we shall try to be clear 
about the “partition” we use: states (provinces) adding up to a nation, or states 
(provinces) adding up to regions which then add up to a nation. 
 
4. The five federations: descriptive statistics and Concept 1 inequality 
 
The analysis of each individual country’s inequality  is conducted on the basis of 
regional GDPs per capita expressed in nominal prices. 
19 Clearly, to the extent that  there 
are price differences within a country and  price levels are higher in richer regions, such 
inequality statistics will tend to overestimate intra-regional inequality.  
 
In order to allow for comparison between regions belonging to different countries, 
all regional GDPs are also expressed in real terms. First, they are expressed in real units 
of  the domestic currency and then converted into the 1995 international dollars ($PPP). 
The typical pattern of conversion is the one for China as expressed in equation (1) where 
Y denotes provincial GDP per capita, r = real provincial growth rate, DD = country-wide 
                                                           
17 For example, in a very detailed summary of the results of the “between” component in different country 
studies given in Sharrocks and Wan (2004, Table 1A), total inequality against which the “between” 
component is measured is sometimes Concept 2 and sometimes Concept 3 inequality. 
18 Yet another problem seems to be that some authors use natural logs and others use logs with the base of 
10. Again, this does not matter for individual studies, but does matter for comparative work. 
19 Except in Indonesia for which we have only real provincial incomes.   15
deflator, and PPP = PPP-equivalent dollar exchange rate. We have, from the Chinese 
statistics, real annual provincial growth rates expressed in 1978 all-China prices. This 
means that real income of region i, country j (=China here) and year t (subsequent to 
1978) is obtained by applying real growth rates to the nominal 1978 regional income.  
Note that the application of real growth rates from region to region implies that 
differences in annual inflation between the regions are accounted for. This amount,  that 
is provincial income in year t expressed in 1978 prices (the denominator in equation 3) is 
then, using the country-wide deflator between 1978 and 1995 (DDj,78,95), converted into 
all-China 1995 prices.
20  This is finally converted into international dollars by using the 
1995 purchasing power exchange rate of the country (obtained from the World Bank 
data). 
95
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A slightly different approach is used for US regions. Nominal incomes (year t 
expressed in dollars of the same year) are converted using the overall country’s deflator 
(DDj) which converts t year’s dollars into the 1995 dollars. This implies that price 
differences across US states are non-existent.
22 Since the US prices are, by construction, 
made to equal to international prices, the PPP convertor is equal to 1 (equation 4) 
1 *
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Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics and our data coverage of the five 
countries. More detailed information regarding countries’ administrative structure is 
given in Annex 1. Figure 1 shows Concept 1 inequality for the five countries calculated 
using Gini and Theil indexes. 
 
                                                           
20 Note that the deflator has only country (j) subscript.  
21 A special caveat must be made regarding Chinese national account data: see the discussion in Annex 1.  
22 There is also no state-level CPI in the United States.   16
We see that the unweighted level of inter-regional inequality is the highest in 
China,  next come Brazil and Indonesia,
23 followed by India and the lowest level of inter-
regional inequality is in the United States, despite the fact that the US has the highest 
number of states and that there is a presumption that Concept 1 inequality will increase 
with greater number of partitions (see Proposition 1 in Shorrocks and Wan, 2004). As we 
can see from Figure 1, the Concept 1 Gini is about 30 for China and Brazil, 25 for 
Indonesia, less than 20 for India, while for the United States is it around 10. The ranking 
of the countries is the more or less same if we use Theil index—except that in the year 
2000 Indonesia displays higher inequality than Brazil. 
 
But the figures also reveal very different time patterns in the evolution of Concept 
1 inequality. China which has the highest levels of inequality displays also significant 
reductions throughout the 1980’s. The decline in regional inequality is particularly 
impressive if we look at the Theil index which puts greater emphasis on what happens at 
the tails of the distribution. The period of regional equalization however comes to a close 
around 1990 and is reversed afterwards. On the contrary, Indonesia and India show 
increasing regional inequality throughout the entire period; Brazil, no noticeable trend. 
Finally, the United States which almost throughout has the lowest level of inter-regional 
differences, shows a burst of increased inequality in the early 1980s, followed by a 
sustained if weak reduction since.  
 
When we look at the evolution of inter-regional inequality within a country, we  
need to distinguish between inter-regional inequality calculated in nominal and real 
prices. As discussed earlier, the former is simply a comparison of regional nominal GDPs 
per capita; the latter is calculated based on GDP per capita and a price structure of a 
given year which  is then “augmented” by annual real growth rates. The results presented 
in Figure 1 are based on nominal magnitudes with the exception of Indonesia where we 
                                                           
23 In accordance with the rest of the literature (see Akita and Kawamura, 2002, and Akita and Lukman, 
1995) regional inequality statistics for Indonesia are based only on non-oil and gas part of the GDP.  
Inequality is significantly greater if we include oil and gas but on the other hand most of these revenues are 
not retained at the provincial level but are appropriated by the Center and then redistributed. Hence such 
inequality would overestimate actual regional inequality in the standard of living of the population.    17
had access to real data only. However, in China and India nominal and real inequality 
measures do not move in parallel. 
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Table 4. Regions in the five countries: descriptive statistics 
 China  India  USA  Brazil  Indonesia 
Period  included  1978-2001 1980-2000 1977-2001 1985-2001 1983-2001 










Constant prices (year)  1978  1980-81  1995  1985  1983 
Number of regions 
included in the study 
29 14 50 26 26 
Total number of regions 
in the country 
30 25 50 26 26 
Not included in the study 






















(million; in 2000)  
1,271  1,033  283 172 213 
Population coverage  (in 
percent; 2000) 1/ 
99 92 100  99 100 












Least populous region 
(million, 2000) 
5.6 (Ningxia)  20.6 (Haryana) 0.5 
(Wyoming) 
0.3 (Roraima)  1.2 (Maluku) 
Richest region (year 
2000; in tho. 1995 











Poorest region (year 
2000; in tho. 1995 
international dollars)  








13.6  4.4 2.1 7.0 12.5 
Median region by 
income (year 2000; in 
tho. 1995 international 
dollars) 




2.4 (East Java) 
GDP per capita (year 
2000; in tho. 1995 
international dollars) 
4.1 1.7 31.5  5.7 3.6 
Note: For the purposes of comparison, GDP per capita is always expressed in 1995 international dollars. No region-specific 
PPP rates are used (e.g. all regions of a given country have their GDP per capita converted into $PPP using a single exchange 
rate).  1/ Population in regions included in the study divided by total population  as defined here. 2/ Pacific and Caribbean 
possessions include 12 territories  only 5 of  which (Puerto Rico, Guam, US Virgin Islands, American Samoa and Mariana 
Islands) have resident population apart from the military. Their total population is 4.4 million (see 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108295.html). 3/ East Timor was included in the Indonesian data until independence in 
1999.  For consistency, we have excluded it throughout. 
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Figure 1. Concept 1 (unweighted inter-regional inequality) in the five countries 
 
 G i n i           T h e i l  
Note: Concept 1 inequality is calculated in nominal terms (except for Indonesia where we have real data 
only). GDP for Indonesia excludes oil and gas data. 
 
Figure 2. China: Concept 1 inequality calculated in nominal  
and real terms (1978 prices) 
Note: Provinces of Qinghai and Hainan (populations of respectively 5 and 7 million) are not 
included in the calculations based on real GDP per capita due to the  lack of data. They are included in the 




























































































Figure 2 shows  very different evolutions of the two inequalities in the case of 
China. If we look at nominal differences in GDP per capita, we note a strong  reduction 
in inter-provincial inequality up to 1990, and a slightly increased level since. The decline 
in nominal inequalities (which is even more dramatic if we look at the Theil than at the 
Gini measure and thus implies that the catch up has been particularly strong for the poor 
provinces) coincides with the period of agricultural liberalization. Since 1990, 
approximately around the time when China enters more substantial liberalization in the 
urban sector,  this trend is reversed. However if we look at the inter-provincial inequality 
in real terms, we see that it remained around Gini of 35 throughout the entire period. The 
implication of these different movements in real and nominal Gini and Theil is that there 
has been a price catch up of the poorer provinces (or that the output mix produced in poor 
provinces has moved toward products whose prices have been rising more than the 
average).  In other words, if in 1978, the poorer provinces had a lower price level,
24 then 
while their real growth rates did not systematically differ from those of the rich 
provinces, their relative price level must have risen in order to observe a decline in 
nominal inter-provincial inequality. After 1990, the two measures move the same way 
indicating that the price catch-up has stopped. 
                                                           
24 This is a very sensible supposition although we cannot prove it since Chinese statistics publish only 
growth rates of the provincial CPIs but do not provide provincial price levels.   21
Figure 3. India:  Concept 1 inequality calculated in nominal 
and real terms (1980-81 prices) 
 
Note: The data on 1999 real GDPs per capita are incomplete and hence not included.  
 
In India, both real- and nominal-based Concept 1 inequality was rising during the 
last twenty years (Figure 3). However, the same phenomenon of the poorer states’ catch-
up in terms of price levels is obvious here too as real-based inter-state inequality is higher 
than the inequality calculated from nominal state  GDPs per capita.  
In Brazil,  inter-state inequality moves up during the periods of high and volatile 
inflation: between 1986 and 1990 inflation accelerated from 150 percent annually to 
almost 3000 percent and inter-state inequality, measured by nominal GDPs per capita,  
rose. (However inequality measured in real terms stayed remarkably constant; Figure 4).  
Deceleration of inflation in 1991 was accompanied by a decline in inter-state income 
differences. But during the next three years as inflation accelerated again (from 400 
percent in 1991 to more than 2000 in 1994), nominal inter-state inequality rose again.  
This is an evolution very similar to what we observe for the United States where also 
inter-state inequality rose during the inflationary period 1977-1981. In both cases, it 
seems that nominal GDPs per capita are very differently affected from state to state when 
inflation is high. This is not unexpected. We know that high inflation and hyperinflation 
are accompanied by greater price volatility, that is real prices of goods and services vary 
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Dabus (2000)). It is then not surprising that different states—which produce different 
output mixes—will also tend to be affected more unevenly when inflation is high than 
when it is low.  
Figure 4. Brazil: Concept 1 inequality calculated in nominal and real terms (1995 prices) 
Note: The state of Tocantins, due to lack of data, is not included in years 1985-1988. 
 
5. Concept 2  regional inequality 
In principle population-weighted inequality (Concept 2) is interesting mostly as a 
stepping stone, or a lower bound to “true” inequality between individuals.  As mentioned 
before, it may reflect the “feeling” of inequality within a country much better than the 
unweighted Concept 1, particularly when regional inequalities coincide with other types 
of horizontal cleavages. 
25Changes in the population-weighted inequality  are important 
for two additional reasons. First, we may want to see whether inequality is driven by the 
differing population growth rates between the regions. For example, increasing Concept 2 
inequality (and very likely increasing inter-personal inequality) may be due to migration 
of the population into faster-growing or richer regions.  
 
Secondly, an interesting issue is whether there is correlation between growth rates 
and population size of different regions. This is in turn relevant for two  reasons. 
                                                           
25 As Venables and Kanbur (2003, p. 11) write: “..it may be the case  that the distribution of individual 
attributes such as ability, is the same in all regions. Spatial [Concept 2] inequality is then particularly 
inequitable and—especially when aligned with political, religious or ethnic tensions—may be dangerous to 
social and political stability. If spatial divisions align with ethnic, religious or language splits, as so often 
happens, then the between group component of inequality takes on a greater significance than its 
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Assuming for the moment that there is no migration between the regions, the evidence of 
a positive relationship between population and economic growth may help shed 
additional light on the issue of increasing returns to scale: greater population may help 
growth if it delays the onset of  diminishing marginal returns. Second, higher growth in 
more populous regions has obvious (positive) implications for the reduction in poverty. If 
income growth rates tend to be higher in more populous regions then—everything else 
being the same—poverty reduction will be greater.   
 
We now turn to these two issues: (i) the influence of uneven regional population 
growth on Concept 2 inequality, and (ii) the association between regional population size 
and per capita GDP growth. But before we do so, we need to quickly look at the results of 
Concept 2 inequality for the five countries. They are displayed in Figure 5. Brazil shows 
the highest inequality with the Gini of about 30. As mentioned before, Concept 2 
inequality sets the lower bound to inter-personal (Concept 3) inequality. This means 
that—were all individual within each state of Brazil to have the same income—overall 
inequality in Brazil would still be substantial. China has a Gini of about 25, Indonesia 
and India about 20 (with the latter steadily catching up) and the US less than 10.
26 The 
ranking of the countries is basically unchanged throughout the period. In the 1990’s, 
inequality was on the rise in all three Asian countries. In the 1980’s, however, China’s 
inequality—measured by the Gini—is constant while Theil shows a strong downward 
trend. This indicates that the period must have been characterized by the catch-up of the 
poorest (population-weighted) provinces.
27 For the three Asian countries, there is a clear 
contrast between the 1980’s when regional inequality was declining or constant and of 
the 1990’s when it is also very clearly going up in all three countries. 
                                                           
26 Since size income inequality in the United States is around 40 (see the 2004 release of  World Income 
Inequality Database available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/), this means that differences in states’ mean 
incomes explain only about a quarter of total US inequality. 
27 This is because Theil is more sensitive than the Gini to what happens at the tails of distribution. A more 
detailed discussion of China’s concept 2 inequality is available in Annex 2 of the Internet version of this 
paper available at http://econpapers.hhs.se/RAS/pmi44.htm 
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Figure 5. Concept 2 (population-weighted inter-regional inequality) in the five countries 
 
     Gini                      Theil 
 
Note : Based on nominal state-level GDP per capita except for Indonesia where only real amounts  are 
available. 
 
We next decompose the change in Gini between the first year for which we have 
data (late 1970’s or early 1980’s depending on the country), 1990 and 2000. Table 5 
shows what Concept 2 inequality would have been if the state/provincial distribution of  
population had remained unchanged, and if provincial growth rates had been the same. 
This enables us to distinguish two effects: uneven population growth, and uneven per 
capita economic growth. The results show that the effect of differential population 
movements has been fairly minor in all countries (see columns 4 and 9). Its greatest effect 
was in the decade of the eighties in Indonesia where it was equalizing and the decade of 
the nineties in China where, on the contrary, it contributed to greater inequality. One has 
to be careful however in the interpretation of the population change. It is for example 
true, in an accounting sense,  that had the composition of Chinese population by province 
remained the same as in 1990, regional inequality in 2000 would have been less. 
However, this takes the per capita incomes by province as given. Yet in a deeper sense 
this is wrong. This is because population might have moved in response to higher wages 
















































































richer states down. Without such an equilibrating movement of labor, inequalities might 
have been even greater.  Thus for a more meaningful analysis, we would need 
information on natural vs. mechanical population changes by state/province.  
 
We turn next to the contribution of differential growth rates to the change in 
Concept 2 inequality (see columns 6 and 11).  There the most remarkable turnaround is in 
the case of China: while in the 1980’s, differential growth by province reduced regional 
inequality by almost 3 Gini points, in the next decade, differential growth added 2.6 Gini 
points to  inequality. In the first period, it is the poor and populous provinces that grew 
relatively fast; in the second period, the poor and populous provinces tended to grow 
slower than average. This is shown in Figure 6 where we note that the position of many 
large and relatively poor provinces slipped from being in the NW quadrant (that is, 
growing faster than average) in the decade of the 1980’s, to the SW quadrant (growing 
slower than average) in the decade of the 1990’s.  
 
In India, differential growth was disequalizing throughout although more so in the 
decade of the nineties. In Indonesia too it was more disequalizing in the 1990’s than in 
the 1980’s. It is only in Brazil, in the 1990’s, that differential growth was substantially 
equalizing.   
 
The equalizing effect of  differential growth rates can occur for two reasons 
however. First, poorer regions may grow faster than the rich. Second, although there may 
be no income convergence among the regions as such, there could be income 
convergence among the populous regions. This   would tend to reduce Concept 2 
inequality.  To explain: assume that populous regions are uniformly distributed across 
income distribution and that there is zero correlation between growth rates and initial 
incomes. Thus, there is neither convergence nor divergence. However, within the 
subgroup of populous regions, let correlation between initial income and growth may be   26
negative. These regions’ incomes will therefore become more clustered, and since it is 
them who “matter” for  Concept 2 inequality, inequality will go down. 
28 
 
                                                           
28 Suppose that there are two rich and small regions called A and B, and two poor and populous regions 
called C and D. Let there be no income convergence, and let  A and C grow at high positive rates, and B 
and D decline. Now, Concept 2 inequality will increase since the two key regions which, because of their 
sizes determine what happens to Concept 2 inequality, will have become dissimilar. Note that this takes 
place while there is neither income divergence not a relationship between population size and growth—but 
simply income divergence between populous regions.   27
 
Table 5. Concept 2 Gini coefficients with actual and hypothetical populations and income 
 
  Change between (circa) 1980 and 1990  Change between 1990 and 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 



























































USA  6.9 8.9 8.9  0  7.1  +1.8  8.3 8.4  +0.1  8.9 -0.6 
China  23.9 20.9 20.9  0  23.8 -2.9 24.4 24.0 +0.4 21.8 +2.6 
India  14.8  16.1  16.1 0 14.8  +1.3  18.7  18.7 0 16.2  +2.5 
Brazil  31.1 30.9 30.8 +0.1 31.3 -0.4 28.0 28.0  0  31.0 -3.0 
Indonesia  19.0 18.8 19.6 -0.8 18.5 +0.3 19.9 20.0 -0.1 18.8 +1.1 
 
Note: The “circa 1980” means the first year for which the data are available: it is 1977 for the United States, 1978 for China, 1980 for India, 1985 for Brazil and 
1983 for Indonesia. All Concept2 Ginis calculated from nominal data except for Indonesia. Indonesian data exclude oil and gas component of GDP.  
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Figure  6. China: Provincial per capita growth, initial income level and population size 




Note: Vertical axis shows average growth rate (in percent per capita) over each period. The size of each dot 
reflects population weight of the province. The city provinces of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are not 
shown. Horizontal lines drawn at the level of nation-wide average growth during each period (7.3 percent 
per capita in the first, 9.2 percent per capita in the second). Vertical line drawn at respectively 1978 and 
1990 nation-wide GDP per capita (expressed in 1995 international dollars).  
 
 
To check the second possibility we regress regional  rates of growth over a period 
of five-years on initial regional income levels as in (5) 
it t i t i it e y y y +   + = − − 1 0 − 5 , 5 , ln ln β β        ( 5 )  
where i is i-th region, t is time, y = real GDP per capita, and the sign of the 
coefficient β1 indicates presence or absence of unconditional convergence. The regression 
is population-weighted since our interest is not in convergence as such but in 
convergence conditional on population size. The regression is calculated for each country 
and for all years. This is done in order to avoid biasing the results through choice of the 
time period and stage of the economic cycle.
29 The clearest results (see Figure 7) are for 
India: they show a statistically significant regional divergence since the early 1990’s. For 
China, it is only in the five-year period ending in 1999, that we come close to having a 
                                                           
29 Petrakos et al. (2002, p. 4) for example show how, using the same data, the choice of different time 
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statistically significant regional divergence. Similarly, Indonesia has a five-year period of 
divergence ending in 1997. In contrast to the three Asian countries that all show some 
evidence of population-weighted divergence in the 1990’s are Brazil and the United 
States. Brazil’s states  were  strongly converging until the mid-1990’s. The United States 
had a period of convergence from about 1990-91 until the late 1990’s. 
 
Consider now what is behind these results. As mentioned before, Concept 2 
convergence or divergence is in reality a convergence or divergence within the subset of 
populous regions. The difference in outcomes among the most populous states is very 
clear in the case of India. Consider the three most populous Indian states: Uttar Pradesh 
(population 170 million in 1999), Bihar (107 million) and Maharashtra (95 million). 
Between 1990 and 1999,  GDP per capita in Maharashtra that was the richest of the three 
states increased by 60 percent (in real terms).  Meanwhile, in Bihar—which is the poorest 
state in India—GDP per capita remained the same. Finally, Uttar Pradesh—which has the 
median level of income among the states—saw its GDP per capita increase by about 15 
percent. The situation is similar in China. The three largest provinces are Sichuan 
(population 114 million in 2000), Henan (92 million) and Shandong (91 million). During 
the decade of the nineties, Shandong which was the richest of the three in 1990 saw its 
real GDP per capita triple. Henan’s GDP per capita increased by 2½ times, and Sichuan’s 
(which was the poorest of the three provinces) “only” doubled. In conclusion, in both 
India and China, the most populous regions diverged in the 1990’s and that drove 
Concept 2 inequality—and possibly inter-personal inequality as well—up.     30
6. How to explain changes in inter-regional inequality? 
 
As we have seen,  levels of  inter-regional inequality are quite different in the five 
countries. Indonesia and Brazil have the highest level of Concept 2 inequality. They are 
followed by China. India is in  the middle but is the only country showing a consistent 
increase in inter-regional inequality while the United States displays the most uniform 
levels of GDP per capita between its component states. We shall try to explain within-
national convergence or divergence in more general terms, that is by looking at the 
variables of interest (at national level) that might contribute to or reduce inter-regional 
inequalities. These variables are not easy to identify in general because of countries’ 
specificities. Thus, for example, the same overall growth rate might produce regional 
divergence in one case, and regional convergence in another depending on what drives 
growth. When growth is narrow-based as in case of oil production, the differences 
between regions (oil-rich and the rest) are likely to increase. When growth is broad-
based, or is fuelled by agricultural growth (as in the case of  China during the early 
liberalization), it can be expected to help convergence as poorer and agricultural regions 
catch up with rich regions. The general presumption—as we have seen from 
Williamson’s (1965) hypothesis—is that growth will tend to be regionally disequalizing 
(even if ultimately higher income may be associated with lower inequalities). We may 
thus expect growth rate to be positively related to regional inequality. This is also a 
finding obtained by Petrakos et al. (2003) in their study of regional inequality in the 
European Union.  The same results are further reported in the case of Indonesia by Akita 
and Kawamura (2002, p.12) who find that the period of fast growth between 1993 and 
1996 was associated with a slightly increasing Concept 2 inequality while the crisis led to 
a decline in regional inequality (p.16). In a long-run 1939-95 study of Brazil’s regional 
inequality  Azzoni (2001, p. 144) finds the same relationship.   31
 
Figure 7.  Unconditional β regional population-weighted convergence or divergence 
(β coefficient with the 95 confidence interval) 
 
    United States                 China          India 
 
Indonesia     Brazil 
 
Note: the regression is ROG(t-5,t)=β0+β1 log GDP (t-5) (population weighted) where ROG=annualized per 
capita growth rate between t-5 and t, and GDP = real GDP per capita in year t-5 (all expressed in constant 
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Similarly, the effect of  greater openness (approximated by the trade to GDP ratio 
in nominal terms) may be ambiguous. Openness can help the already rich regions, or can 
create income gaps where none existed. But it can also help poorer regions whose output 
(e.g. agricultural goods) was artificially held down through price controls. On the other 
hand, one can argue that there may be certain policies associated with globalization 
whose effects are less likely to be ambivalent. They include policies of financial 
liberalization and higher interest rate that tend to favor rich households. To the extent that 
rich people are concentrated in certain areas, such policies will increase spatial inequality. 
As for the empirical results, they span the entire gamut. Kanbur and Zhang (2003) find 
that openness was associated with rising inequality in China. Zhang and Zhang (2003) 
similarly decompose Concept 1 inequality between China’s states and find that about 20 
percent of differences in provincial GDPs per capita can be ascribed to differences in 
trade shares (p. 57).
30 Petrakos et al. (2002, p. 19) however find that openness (defined as 
regional integration within the European Union
31) did not have a uniform impact on all 
EU countries: in some it was associated with greater regional inequality, in others by 
smaller, and in some had no statistically significant effect at all. Wei and Wu (2001) 
using  urban/rural ratios of mean income for more than 100 cities and their adjoining 
areas in China find that in the period 1988-93 increased openness tended to reduce the 
urban/rural ratio. Since urban/rural differences are perhaps the principal explanation for 
regional inequality in  China, increased openness would seem to reduce  regional 
inequality.  
 
Visual inspection of Figure 8 which displays the relationship between openness 
and Concept 1 inequality shows that all of our five countries (with the exception of 
Indonesia), have, as we would expect, relatively low openness. The graph also shows that 
in China, increased openness was not associated with increased regional inequality while, 
on the contrary, in India, this seems to be clearly the case.  At the other extreme is 
                                                           
30 Their approach is interesting because they run production functions of the same form for all provinces. 
One of the arguments in the production function is trade ratio (in addition to education, domestic and 
foreign capital accumulation etc.) Then log variance of GDPs per capita is decomposed and the regression 
coefficients times the covariance between income and each argument gives an estimate of that particular 
argument’s contribution to inter-provincial income inequality. 
31 And measured as share of European trade in country’s total trade.   33
Indonesia where increased openness was associated with a decrease in regional 
inequality. Finally in Brazil and the United States, there was no apparent relationship 
between openness and regional inequality. The conclusion is that the country experiences 
differ and that openness as such may not have the same discernable effects on countries 
regardless of their level of development, type of economic institutions, and other macro 
economic policies.  
 
A somewhat different picture however emerges when we look at the relationship 
between Concept 2 inequality and openness (Figure 9). It is now very clear that in both 
China and India, increased openness was associated with greater regional inequality. In 
Indonesia, the relationship is the opposite and in Brazil and the US the correlations seems 
non-existent.  
 
We then run two types of regressions across both Concept 1 and Concept 2 
inequalities  (see equation 6). The first type are fixed-effect panel regressions, the second 
are Arellano-Bover GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) regressions.  
it it it it it it it u INFL RINT OPEN GDP ROG I + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β ln    (6) 
where I = inequality concept that can be either Gini  or Theil (with e.g. Gini2 
denoting Gini coefficient under Concept 2 inequality),  i denotes country, t = year, ROG 
= real annual rate of growth of per capita GDP, GDP = level of  GDP per capita,  OPEN 
= trade to GDP ratio in current prices, RINT = real interest rate (on deposits) in percent 
per annum, INFL = the average annual rate of inflation proxied by the change in 
consumer price index.  GDP and rate of growth of GDP are included, as discussed in 
Section 2, to test for the presence of  short- and long-term effects of growth on regional 
inequality (as implied by, among others, by Williamson’s 1965 hypothesis).
32 The 
possible role of openness is explained above. We also include real rate of interest and 
inflation as possible controls on the assumption that both can contribute to regional 
                                                           
32 This is also the reason why a squared GDP per capita term (in the spirit of the Kuznets hypothesis) is not 
included. The latter is a test of  inter-personal inequality in the presence of structural change (and increase 
in income). Here  we test regional inequality which, according to the Williamson and Perroux hypotheses, 
should be less in the already developed  economies where market integration is more advanced. Per capita 
income thus serves as a proxy for the extent of integration of capital, labor and goods markets. 
   34
inequality: the first because a higher rate of interest will increase incomes of property-
owners who also tend to be spatially concentrated; the second, because higher inflation is 
often  associated with greater variability in relative prices. To the extent that different 
regions specialize in producing different output-mixes, then relative price variability will 
affect them differently, thus adding to inequality.  
 
All variables in (6) are defined at national level. Inequality that is calculated 
across provinces is Concept 1 or Concept 2 inequality at the national level (in the same 
way that inequality across individuals in a country is a national level variable). The other 
variables are obviously so.  It is an unbalanced panel since the number of observations for 
each country is not the same (e.g. for China we have the data for the 1978-2000 period, 
but for Indonesia only for 1983 to 2001). Since there are unobservable country-specific 
effects and the number of regional units per country varies (which in turn means that, 
everything else being the same, countries with  a greater number of regional units would 
tend to have higher inequality), we use the fixed effects model.
  However if we 
acknowledge that inequality is  a process characterized with a high degree of persistence, 
we have to move to dynamic panels (with the lagged inequality value on the RHS). The 
introduction of the lagged dependent variable makes the fixed-effect estimator 
inconsistent in small samples. To account for that we use Arellano-Bover GMM system 
estimator which similarly to the Arellano-Bond estimator involves first-differencing to 
remove possible country fixed effects, instrumenting of predetermined and endogenous 
variables by their lagged values, 
33 but also extracts as much information as possible from 
the data by estimating the regressions both in levels and changes and imposing the 
equality of the slopes  between the two.  
 
                                                           
33 We also use as instruments population size and land area. The Sargan test of identifying restrictions is  
statistically insignificant throughout implying acceptance of exogeneity of instruments.   35
 























Note: Both inequality concepts are expressed in real terms. The data for 
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Table 6. Determinants of regional inequality 
  Concept 1 inequality  Concept 2 inequality 
  Gini1 Theil1 Gini2 Theil2 
 
 Fixed  effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Lagged Gini 
or Theil  
  0.977 
(0.000) 
  0.973 
(0.000) 
  0.973 
(0.000) 



































































































































Note: p values between brackets. Coefficients significant at 5 percent or less are shaded. Real interest = real annual rate of interest in percent p.a. 
divided by 1000.  Inflation = ln (1+annual inflation rate in percent). Openness = trade/GDP (in nominal US dollars). GDP per capita = ln GDP per capita  in 1995 
international dollars. ROG = annual  rate of growth of GDP per capita (expressed in fractions, e.g. 3 percent is expressed as  0.03). Gini and Theil are expressed 
as ratios and calculated across real regional incomes. Arellano-Bond is one-step GMM estimator; calculations done using David Roodman’s xtabond2.ado 
STATA software.    37
 
The results of estimation are displayed in Table 6. Regarding Concept 1 
inequality, we see that practically no variable in either formulation seems to have any 
influence and the quality of the overall results is very weak. Contrary to several other 
studies, we do not find evidence that higher rate of growth has a disequalizing effect on 
regional incomes. The situation is different when we move to the determinants of 
Concept 2 regional inequality. There, according to both Gini and Theil, and when using 
dynamic panel specification, higher rate of growth is disequalizing, and higher income 
level is equalizing. We thus find the same results as obtained by Petrakos, Rodriguez-
Pose and Roviolis (2003), in the context of the European Union regions. 
34The effect of 
higher growth rate on Concept 2 inequality is rather  small though: an acceleration of 
national growth rate by 1 percentage point is associated  on average with an increase of 
Concept 2 inequality by 0.046 Gini points. Inflation is disequalizing only in the static 
(fixed-effects) framework. Openness, however, although it enters all the regressions with 
a positive sign, is not statistically significant in none of them. The same is true for real 
rate of interest which shows a sign change as well.  
 
7. Conclusions  
  
The three Asian countries show much greater evidence of increasing regional 
income inequality than Brazil and the United States. Divergence in China, India and 
Indonesia is evident in the decade of the 1990’s. The clearest case is that of India.  In the  
1990’s, it shows  a consistently increasing regional inequality of both Concept 1 and 2 
types—whether it is measured by the Gini or by the Theil index. The largest states 
(Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) are diverging in their incomes, and generally 
richer states have registered faster growth.  
 
The experience of the 1990’s is in contrast to that of the previous decade for all 
three countries. In China during the 1980’s, there was a convergence between the regions. 
It coincided with the period of agricultural reforms which enabled poorer regions to catch 
                                                           
34 In fixed-effects though, income level is positively associated with Concept 2 inequality and rate of 
growth is not significant.    38
up. Moreover, over the same period, there was also a strong Concept 2 convergence. The 
process comes to a halt in the 1990’s with provincial mean incomes growing at relatively 
similar rates (Concept 1 inequality stable), but, importantly, Concept 2 inequality 
increasing. Similarly to what we noted for India, in China the divergence in the second 
half of the 1990’s was driven by the divergence in outcomes between  populous 
provinces. As there is a contrast between Maharashtra and Bihar in India, there is a 
contrast between Shandong and Sichuan in China.  
 
  As for the two non-Asian countries studied here, the United States, despite 
already being most regionally homogeneous, has generally displayed tendency toward 
income convergence according to both inequality concepts. Brazil shows least consistent 
change. There is only a slight change in both Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality, but it 
is overshadowed by a cyclical effect of inflation. It is therefore difficult to see whether 
there is any trend. Nevertheless Brazil has the highest Concept 2 Gini inequality of all 
countries included here. To see how large that inequality is, one need simply realize that 
were all incomes within each state absolutely equal, Brazil’s overall Gini would still be 
around 30, a moderate nation-wide inequality level. 
 
When we try to fit our findings into an admittedly Procrustean bed of regression 
analysis, we do not find much evidence, even after  adjusting for countries’ unobservable 
characteristics, that the most obvious variables used in the work on regional inequality 
explain its Concept 1 change over time. Turning to population-weighted regional 
inequality, we find that it tends to be positively associated with faster growth and 
negatively with income level. As for openness, although its coefficient  is positive, it is 
not statistically significant in any of the formulations. High inflation is (in static panel 
framework) associated with higher Concept 2 inequality.  
 
  Global inequality changes and inequality changes in the  five most populous 
countries in the world during the last two decades have indeed been quite dramatic but 
also extremely complex. Note the following facts. While at the level of these countries, 
we find no evidence for  the narrowing of (unweighted) inter-regional income differences   39
during the decade of the 1990’s, Concept 2 inequality however tended to rise in the two 
most important countries (India and China) as well as Indonesia. But at the global level, a 
process directly opposite to the one at the national level was simultaneously taking place. 
It consisted  of widening income differences between the countries (as poor countries 
have tended to lag in growth rates behind the rich) and a reduction in Concept 2 
inequality thanks mostly to China’s phenomenal growth. In other words, while within 
India or China during the last ten years or so,  Concept 1 inequality was stable and 
Concept 2 inequality was increasing, on the global level (mostly thanks to what was  
happening precisely in these two countries), Concept 1 inequality was up and Concept 2 
inequality went down.   
 
Even without addressing the most difficult task of measurement of inter-personal 
inequality at the global level, one can easily see how contradictory are recent changes in 
different facets of inequality  and how inadequate are simple answers regarding both the 
direction of change and even more so regarding the causality. In other words, when we 
ask a question as apparently simple as “what was a change in inequality in country X”, 
we need to define very carefully what we mean by inequality since its different versions 
may easily move in the opposite directions.   40
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China is officially administratively divided into 34 regional units: 23 provinces 
(including Taiwan, China), 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau), 5 
autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet) and 4 
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing).  The autonomous regions 
differ from the rest because of the presence of significant non-Han minorities in them.  
 
We are not including in the analysis Taiwan (China), Hong Kong and Macau 
because the GDP data for them are not shown together with other regions. In addition, 
Chongqing acquired the status of a separate unit (municipality) only in 1997 and in our 
data is included together with Sichuan. This therefore gives us 30 regional units which 
for simplicity we call “provinces.”  Out of these thirty, full data sets (both nominal and 
real GDPs) are available for 27 provinces which represent 99 percent of Chinese 
population (not counting Taiwan, China; Hong Kong; Macau). For two provinces 
(Qinghai and Hainan), nominal GDP is available from 1985 onwards. 
35 Hence in 
calculations with nominal values, 29 provinces are included. Finally, for Tibet neither 
real nor nominal GDP data are available.  
 
A note is in order regarding Chinese GDP per capita data.
36 There are three types 
of problems with these data. First, all-China GDP data are the subject of a long academic 
dispute. Many authors argue that Chinese official  statistics exaggerate both the level and 
rate of growth of the economy (Maddison, 2003, p. 151; Maddison, 1998;  Heston, 2001; 
Xu 1999; Rawski, 2001). If this is true then provincial growth rates must also be 
exaggerated. While we tend to believe that these authors do have a point and that the total 
GDP correction does make sense, the only source of provincial Chinese statistics is the 
official State Statistics Bureau. We thus use official regional and nation-wide statistics 
                                                           
35 Hainan became a separate province in 1988. Previously it was part of Guangdong province.   43
for the entire 1978-2001 period. Second, until 1994, the sum of provincial GDPs was  
approximately equal to the official value of the nation-wide GDP. The discrepancy was  
within a very narrow  range of 1-2 percentage points possibly due to the mistakes of 
classification. But after 1994, the sum of provincial GDPs is systematically greater (up to 
15 percent) than the nation-wide GDP (see Holz, 2004, pp. 388-9; Milanovic, 2005, pp. 
97-8). It is unclear what the source of this large discrepancy is. Heston (2001, p. 3) 
ascribes it to the “winds of falsification“. Holz (2004) similarly blames data falsification 
at lower-level administrative units. Third, the denominator in GDP per capita data is the 
officially registered population (see Scharping, 2001). This tends to underestimate actual 
population living in richer provinces which, due to their dynamism, attract the bulk of  
“floating population” (people who do not have official permits to live in a given city). 
GDP per capita for richer provinces is accordingly overestimated and GDP per capita for 
poorer provinces underestimated, thus biasing our inequality statistics upward. We have 
no way out of this conundrum. This is because the only existing data on provincial GDP 
and provincial population are the official data.  
 
India 
India was until the year 2000 administratively divided into 25 states and 7 Union 
territories. The Union territories are very small with the exception of the federal capital of 
Delhi. In total they account for about 11 million people or a little over 1 percent of total 
population (in the 1991 census). India is officially defined as a “union of states” (Article 
2 of the 1949 Constitution). Out of 25 states, we have GDP per capita data for 14 states. 
These are the largest states comprising 92 percent of total Indian population in 2000. Of  
the states for which we do not have the data, the largest are Assam, and Jammu and 
Kashmir (respectively 23 and 8 million according to the 1991 census).  The disputed 
parts of Kashmir are also omitted from the analysis (the data for them are included in 
Chinese and Pakistani statistics). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36 An entire issue of  China Economic Review (vol. 12, No. 4, 2001) was dedicated to the data problems in 
Chinese statistics.    44
In 2000, three new states were created. They are Uttaranchal or Uttarkhand 
(population of 4 million), carved out of Uttar Pradesh (170 million before the split), 
Jharkhand (population of  15 million) carved out of Bihar (107 million before the split), 
and Chhattisgargh (population of 19 million) carved out of Madhya Pradesh (79 million 
before the split). All three are based on ethnic distinctiveness from their “mother” states. 
In our data for 2000, these states are included as part of their “mother” states.  
 
United States 
United States is administratively divided in 50 states and 1 federal district (the 
federal capital of Washington). In the Constitution, the United States is not officially 
defined as a federation although this is implicit from the text. United States also controls 
some 12 Commonwealths and territories out of which Puerto Rico is the largest (3.7 
million people). Our data cover the 50 states and the District of Columbia. However, the 
latter, due to its peculiarities,
37 is not included  in the analysis which thus bears only on 
the 50 federal units. Since District’s population is only about 600,000 people, our 
coverage of the United States is almost complete. 
 
Brazil 
Brazil is administratively divided in 26 states and 1 federal district (the federal 
capital of Brasilia). It is officially a federation (hence the official name since 1988 of 
“Federative Republic of Brazil”). Our data include all states with the exception of 
Tocantins for the years 1985-88. The federal district of Brasilia (population 2 million) is 




                                                           
37 For example, District’s GDP per capita is unrealistically high, at more than $PPP 90,000. This is due to 
the fact that many businesses are registered in the District while people who work or own them live just 
outside the borders of the District.  
 
38 The  state level value added data for Brazil (available at Instituto Braseleiro de Geografia e Estatistrica, 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/default.shtm) account for between 95 
and 98 percent of all-Brazil sum from the official statistics. Almost all of that difference is explained by the 
fact that state data used here exclude the federal territory of Brasilia (its share of all-Brazil GDP varies 
between 3 and 5 percent).   45
Indonesia is administratively divided in 26 provinces.  Before East Timor’s 
independence in 1999, there were 27 provinces. The data for East Timor are available for 
the entire period during which it was an Indonesian province, but for the reasons of  
comparability, we have omitted it from our calculations throughout the entire period. The 
population coverage of Indonesia is thus 100 percent. 
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Included countries and states/provinces 
China India  Indonesia  Brazil  USA 
(Prices: 1978)  (Prices: 1980-81)  (Prices: 1983)  (Prices: 1985)  (Prices: 1995) 
Beijing Andhra  Pradesh  Aceh  Acre  Alabama 
Tianjin Bihar  North  Sumatra  Alagaos  Alaska 
Heibei Gujarat  West  Sumatra  Amapa  Arizona 
Shanxi Haryana  Riau  Amazonas  Arkansas 
Neimeng Karnataka  Jambi  Bahia  California 
Liaoning Kerala  South  Sumatra  Ceara  Colorado 
Jilin Madhya  Pradesh  Bengkulu  Distrito  Federal  Connecticut 
Heilongjiang Maharashtra  Lampung  Espirito  Santo    Delaware 
Shanghai Orissa  Jakarta  Goias  Florida 
Jiangsu Punjab  West  Java  Maranhao  Georgia 
Zhejiang  Rajasthan  Central Java  Mato Grasso  Hawaii 
Anhui  Tamil Nadu  Yogyakarta  Mato Grosso do Sul  Idaho 
Fujian  Uttar Pradesh  East Java  Minas Gerais  Illinois 
Jiangxi West  Bengal  Bali  Para  Indiana 
Shandong   West  Kalimantan  Paraiba  Iowa 
Henan   Central  Kalimantan  Parana  Kansas 
Hubei   South  Kalimantan  Pernambuco  Kentucky 
Hunan   East  Kalimantan  Piaui  Louisiana 
Guangdong    North Sulawesi  Rio de Janeiro  Maine 
Guangxi    Central Sulawesi  Rio Grande do Norte  Maryland 
Hainan    South Sulawesi  Rio Grande do Sul  Massachusetts 
Sichuan   Southeast  Sulawesi  Rondonia  Michigan 
Guizhou   West  Nusa  Tenggara  Roraima  Minnesota 
Yunnan    East Nusa Tenggara Santa  Catarina  Mississippi 
Shannxi   Maluku  Sao  Paulo  Missouri 
Gansu   Irian  Jaya  Sergipe  Montana 
Qinghai   Timor  Timur  Tocantins  Nebraska 
Ningxia       Nevada 
Xinjang       New  Hampshire 
       New  Jersey 
       New  Mexico 
       New  York 
       North  Carolina 
       North  Dakota 
       Ohio 
       Oklahoma 
       Oregon 
       Pennsylvania 
       Rhode  Island 
       South  Carolina 
       South  Dakota 
       Tennessee 
       Texas 
       Utah 
       Vermont 
       Virginia 
       Washington 
       West  Virginia 
       Wisconsin 
       Wyoming   47
Annex 2. Regional inequality in China 
 
China at the end of the 20
th century: different regional inequality break-downs 
(Concept 2 inequality throughout) 
 
 
  Akira and Kawamura 
(2002) 
Kanbur and Zhang 
(2003, Table 2) 
Modified  (Milanovic) 
Kanbur and Zhang 
(2003)  
Bhalla, Yao and Zhang 
(2003) 
Milanovic (here) 
Year  1998 2000 2000 1995 2000 
Welfare concept  GDP per capita  Mean real per capita 
consumption 1/ 
Mean real per capita 
consumption 1/ 
Mean real per capita 
consumption 2/ 
GDP per capita 
Smallest unit with data  District level GDP per 
capita  
Rural/urban   Rural/urban   Rural/urban 
(=peasant/non-peasant) 
Provincial GDP per 
capita 
Aggregation  By province (26) and by 
regions (3) 
By province (28)  By province (28)  By province (28)  --- 
Total number of observations (per 
year) 
335  56 56 56 29 
Concept 2 Theil 3/  24.9  24.8  24.8  16.54 (see note)  10.4 
 (which Theil?)  Theil (1)  Theil (0)  Theil(0)  Theil (1)  Theil (1) 
Between 3 large regions  6.6 (27)         
Between provinces (within each 
region) 
2.8  (11)      
Between 28 provinces alone  9.4 (38)    10.9 (44)  11.0 (67)  10.4 (100) 
Within provinces (between districts)  15.6  (62)      
Within provinces (between rural and 
urban) 
   13.9  (56)    
Between overall rural and overall 
urban mean 
  13.9 (56)    10.4 (75)   
Within rural areas and within urban 
areas 
  10.9  (44)   6.1  (25)  
Within rural areas        3.8 (21)   
Within urban areas        2.3 (4)   
Concept 2 Gini 3/  n.a.  37.2  37.2  n.a.  24.4   48
 
Sources: Takahiro and Kawamura (2002, Table 1, p. 26). Kanbur and Zhang (2003, Table 2, p. 27). Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003, Table 2, p. 947). 
Modified Kanbur Zhang consists of taking Kanbur and Zhang data and applying somewhat different partitions (for explanation, see the text below). 
1/ In 1983 prices. 2/ In 1990 prices, using provincial price deflators. 3/ Based on the most detailed partition used in the paper, e.g. 335 observations in 
Akira and Kawamura paper etc.   
 


























Note: The Kanbur and Zhang (2003) and Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003) results should be very similar since their welfare concepts and the 
aggregations/partitions are practically the same. And indeed, for the year 1995 (last year in Bhalla et al.) Kanbur and Zhang report a Concept 2 Theil of 17.7 
while Bhalla et. al. have obtain a Theil of  16.5 (see the results in the Table here). However, inexplicably, in their paper Bhalla et. all (Table 2, p. 947) show the 
total Concept 2 Theil of 13.87 while the sum of the three element into which the Theil is decomposed yields 16.54. I think that the latter amount is correct. 
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The decomposition rules can be also presented graphically. In the Akita and 
Kawamura (2002) paper, total inequality is the sum of three inequalities given in 
“bolded” boxes with their respective values in the year 2000 given underneath the boxes. 
We can now easily see that provinces within each of the three large regions are fairly 
homogeneous (in terms of per capita income) and that the bulk of inequality is 
concentrated at the provincial level (differences in incomes between districts) and 
between the three large regions (East, Central, West) 
 
China  = 
 
      +  
Inequality between 
provinces (wihin each 




districts within each 
province 




15.6   50
 















 (1) Difference between the overall rural and urban mean, (2) inequality within the urban 
means (area U), and (3) inequality within the rural means (area R). The component (1) is 
equal  to 13.9 Theil points, the sum of components (2) and (3) is equal to 10.9 Theil 
points. 
 
A modified Kanbur-Zhang (K-Zh) decomposition which we use here is to break 
inequality by provinces. Then, the component (1) is inequality between all provincial 
(total) means, and the component (2) is the sum of all inequalities between provincial 
rural and urban means, that is inequality between Ua and Ra, plus inequality between Ub 
and Rb and so forth. The component (1) amounts to 10.9 Theil points, 
39 the sum of rural-
to-urban inequalities within provinces amounts to 13.9  Theil points. 
                                                           
39 Note that because of Theil’s exact decomposition property, inequality among Ps must be equal to 
inequality among U’s plus inequality among R’s, that is the sum of Kanbur and Zhang’s components (2) 
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These two decompositions suggest the following. First, note that the sum of two 
shaded boxes in the Akura and Kawamura (AK) decomposition equals (by definition) the 
shaded box in the modified Kanbur and Zhang decomposition.
40 But while for Akira and 
Kawamura, the importance of the two shaded boxes adds to 9.4 Theil points, the shaded 
box in the (modified) Kanbur and Zhang decomposition amounts to 10.9 Theil points. 
The difference must be due to the use GDP per capita in one study vs. expenditure per 
capita from household surveys in another.  
 
Second, from the Akira and Kawamura decomposition, we can conclude that   
most of regional inequality in China is found between the three large regions and within 
provinces (in other words, provinces contain districts with fairly unequal average 
incomes).  But, the Kanbur and Zhang decomposition suggests that these districts are not 
random, that is they are not randomly poor or rich. The main line of differentiation goes 
between rural and urban areas. For while AK decomposition shows that inequality 
between districts (within all provinces) equals 15.6 Theil points, the K-Zh decomposition 
                                                           
40 This must be true for Theil (which both authors use) because of its decomposability. 
 
Inequality between 26 
provinces 
Sum of inequality within each 
province 
Sum of rural/urban 
inequalities within each 
province 
10.9 
13.9   52
shows that 13.9 out of these 15.6 Theil points is due to the differences between mean 
rural and mean urban incomes.
41 
 
Thus, in conclusion, we can say that if we break China into a very fine regional 
partition, about 40 percent of thus calculated Concept 2 inequality is due to differences in 
incomes between provinces. The bulk of the remaining 60 percent is due to the 
differences in mean urban and rural income within provinces.   
 
                                                           
41 Abstracting from the fact that the things are not fully comparable because A-K use GDP per capita while 
K-Zh use household survey data. 